Filed Under: The Future of Crimea

The Future of Crimea

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Before the Soviet Union ended, Crimea had already declared its independence. In a January 1991 referendum, the peninsula voted to act as an independent participant in the ongoing New Union Treaty negotiations. It became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), led by Nikolai Bagrov, separate from the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian Federation. Had negotiations been successful and the Soviet Union saved, Crimea would have been its own autonomous subject.

The fate of the Crimean ASSR was decided over a series of referenda held in 1992. The documents comprising this artifact are drawn from the surrounding debates. One, representing the “Republican Movement of Crimea,” advocated for full independence. Another, from the “Crimean organization of the Ukrainian Republican Party,” advocated for integration into Ukraine. And the third, in biting satire, is written from the perspective of a serf or lackey swearing sardonic fealty to “Master [Leonid] Kravchuk,” independent Ukraine’s first president (1991-1994).

The Republicans won the referendum, but only conditionally. The Crimean ASSR was renamed the Republic of Crimea and proclaimed self-government, but its pending constitution would have to be adopted in another referendum months later. Its independence was immediately challenged by Kyiv, leading it to amend its not-yet-approved constitution to declare itself part of Ukraine. The peninsula’s independence raised concerns in Moscow, too, not least because it was home to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, stationed at Sevastopol—a city that had held special federal status in the Soviet era. It reported not to the Oblast capital, Simferopol, nor to the Republican capital, Kyiv, but directly to Moscow. In April 1992, the presidents of newly independent Ukraine and Russia both signed declarations bringing the Black Sea Fleet under the Ministry of Defense in each respective country. Leonid Kravchuk’s declaration came first, on 5 April, beating Boris Yeltsin’s by only two days. A Russian-Ukrainian settlement later that year brought the Black Sea Fleet under the dual command of the two countries for a period of three years while a more permanent solution was negotiated.

By 1995, Crimea’s independence, and especially the authoritarian tendencies of its leader Yuri Meshkov, became too much for Kyiv. Elected in 1994 as President of Crimea (a position Kyiv never recognized), the pro-Russian Meshkov immediately came into conflict with the Crimean parliament. The parliament quickly downgraded his position from head of state to chief executive, and Meshkov responded by disbanding parliament and declaring sole control of the peninsula. On 17 March 1995, Ukrainian special forces entered Meshkov’s residence, detained him, and sent him to Moscow. The Crimean constitution was scrapped and Kyiv appointed Anotolii Franchuk Prime Minister of what was now the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. A new constitution was adopted in 1998.

Meanwhile, in May 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, which recognized Ukraine’s borders and territorial integrity and Kyiv’s sovereignty over all of Crimea. The following year, the Black Sea Fleet was finally divided between Russia and Ukraine. Russia ended up with 80% of the fleet, but Ukraine still controlled the territory, leasing out the naval base at Sevastopol to Russia at a rate of $100 million a year.

This treaty held until irregular Russian forces invaded in February 2014 and Moscow unilaterally annexed the peninsula the next month. Although Putin’s illegal and unprovoked annexation of Crimea came as a surprise to many observers, the peninsula’s complicated history puts both Putin’s power grab and its widespread acceptance among local residents and the international community into perspective. Debates over Crimea’s fate had been a central element in establishing the post-Soviet world order. In this light, Putin’s invasion is not about “setting right” historical “wrongs” or bringing an “ethnically Russian” region “back” under Russian control. It is about breaking the delicate balances established in the early 1990s and contesting international borders through brutal military force.