Table of contents
- → Volume Abstract: "Inventing the Post-Soviet Public Sphere: Media Culture of the Russian 1990s" by Maya Vinokour
- → Introduction. “From Perestroika and the ‘Wild’ 1990s to ‘Putin’s Russia’: A Multimedia History” by Maya Vinokour
- → Chapter 1. “The Sociological Turn: Public Opinion Polling and the Dream of an Open Society” by Bradley Gorski
- → Chapter 2. “The Disappearing Reader: The Disintegration of the Press-Reader Relationship in the Soviet/Post-Soviet Press, 1985-1995” by Courtney Doucette
- → Chapter 3. “Russian Media in the 1990s, Fully Disclosed: Gore, Tabloids, and Countercultural Nationalism” by Fabrizio Fenghi
- → Chapter 4. “The Rock-and-Roll State: Popular Music, Print Media, and Soviet Bureaucracy” by Rita Safariants
- → Chapter 5. “B.U.Kashkin: The Underground Seeking the Public in the 1990s” by Daniil Leiderman
- → Chapter 6. “Russia’s Gay (and Not-So-Gay) Nineties: Sexual and Gender-Expression Pluralism in the first post-Soviet Decade” by Thomas Keenan
- → Chapter 7. “The Revolution of the New Narod: Perestroika, GKChP, and the Televised Post-Soviet Subject at Vzgliad/ ViD” by Pavel Khazanov
- → Chapter 8. “Memory and Media in Post-Soviet Russia: The 1990s to the Present” by Maya Vinokour
Chapter 8. “Memory and Media in Post-Soviet Russia: The 1990s to the Present”
This chapter looks back at thirty years of media history, showing that the repressions Putin’s government unleashed on independent outlets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were several decades in the making. Governmental decisions that appear contingent or spontaneous are, instead, the product of two parallel processes that unfurled after perestroika and the USSR’s collapse. The first is the economic transformation of the early 1990s, which produced an oligarchy that commodified and consolidated television and print media. This process culminated in Boris Yeltsin’s contentious re-election campaign of 1996, a highly mediatized affair that set the stage for political machinations later in the decade. The second process is Russia’s perennial drive to “remember” its difficult past, which is generally followed by a backlash that seeks to force memory back underground. Though they may at first appear unrelated, these two processes are tightly entwined. Their collective effect is a dangerous ideological presentism that forecloses the creation of truly independent media institutions—and the development of publics that would demand them.